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FORDHAm LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS OF INSANE PERSONS IN
NEW YORK.
Although the fundamental law concerning the contracts of
insane persons is fairly well known, considerable confusion exists
in the application of the law to particular cases. It is undoubtedly
true that one who is so deficient mentally as to be unable to com-
prehend the force of his bargain in making a binding agreement
with another, cannot bring to that transaction one of the "minds"
necessary for the "meeting of minds" so essential to a contract,
and thus his alleged contract would be a nullity." The unfortunate
consequences which flow from this view, however,-some of them
not tending at all to the protection of the lunatic-have led to a
general acceptation of the doctrine that the lunatic's contracts are
voidable and not void.2 From this conclusion it follows inciden-
tally that such contracts are binding until disaffirmed and cannot
be attacked by third parties or by the sane party to the bargain.
Before discussing further the voidability of lunatics' contracts,
let it be understood that the contracts of an insane person made
while under guardianship or commitment are not to be considered
under the general rule as stated above. Such contracts are abso-
lutely void, the inquisition and adjudication of the Court as to the
status of the lunatics being binding on the world.3
Lunacy proceedings, moreover, give rise to a prima facie pre-
sumption that the subject of the inquiry was incapable of contract-
ing, prior to the proceeding, during any period which was over-
reached by the finding of the Jury.4
The .decisions of various jurisdictions on the effect of the
contracts of insane persons, with reference to whose capacity there
has been no adjudication, are not at all uniform. In general, to
determine whether one is incapable of making a binding contract
or not, depends upon whether "he was capable of understanding
its terms or forming a rational judgment of its effect on his in-
terests."' "Mere weakness of mind or partial insanity, or mono-
mania, unconnected with the subject matter of the contract is not
1Dexter v. Hail, 15 Wall 9.
'Blinn v. Schwarz, 177 N. Y. 252.
'Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67. N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure 2320
et seq.
'Hughes v. Jones, supra.
"Pollock's Principles of Cont. p. 81.
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sufficient."" A man may be suffering from a defect of mind which
is unquestioned and which may be very serious and yet be capable
of entering into a binding contract. The rule is analogous to that
in establishing testamentary capacity, and if the mental condition
was such that "the act was the intelligent act of the individual,
based upon his intelligent and rational judgment, with sufficient
mental power to understand the nature of his property or of the
business he was transacting", the contract is binding.7 In a recent
New York case, the grantor in a deed was suffering from melan-
cholia, and was obsessed with the idea that he and his family were
doomed to financial disaster. He subsequently, as a result of this
delusion, killed himself and his sons. The Court upheld his deed
as valid, saying that some connection must be shown between the
grantor's insane delusion and his deed.8
Assuming that an individual is so mentally deficient, within the
rule as laid down above, as to be incapable of a binding contractual
act, but not under any legal commitment, to what extent are his
contracts voidable? The sane party to the contract may or may
not have had knowledge of the insanity; the contract may be fair,
reasonable and even beneficial to the insane person; the contract
may be partly or fully executed and the insane person unable to
place the other party in statu quo. How far do these considera-
tions affect the voidability of the contract? In the law of infancy
there seems to be a tendency recently to restrict the absolute right
of infants to avoid, to the extent that if possible the Court shall
adjust the rights of the parties equitably, and make the privilege
of the infant more and more a shield rather than a sword. So,
with regard to the contracts of insane persons, much confusion has
arisen from the efforts of Courts on the one hand to protect the
ward of the Court-the insane person-and on the other hand to
refrain from penalizing innocent persons dealing with such in-
competents.
The result is that in very many cases the contract of one
admittedly mentally incapable of realizing the nature and effect
of his act is held absolutely binding. This is of course at variance
with the original proposition with reference to the meeting of
minds necessary to every contract, but not so anomalous in view
of the more modem idea that actual mental assent is not essential
to a contract, but merely an apparent assent gleaned by each party
'Lawson on Contracts, Par. 161.
7Moritz v. Moritz, 153 App. Div. 147.
'Moritz v. Moritz, supra.
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from the overt expressed intention of the other. This basic and
theoretical difficulty being disposed of, the consideration which
moves the Court in setting aside the contracts of incompetents is
an attempt to relieve the incompetent from oppression, where to
withhold the relief would be a hardship. But a disposition which
works a hardship on the sane person in order to relieve the incom-
petent should not follow from such a principle.
In a leading English case it seems to be established broadly
that the insanity of one party to a contract does not entitle that
party to any relief, unless the other party knew of the insanity,-
and this whether the contract is executed or executory.9 Follow-
ing this case, in many instances the English Courts seem to have
wholly withdrawn their'protection from incompetents because some
hardship would result to the other party.
The Courts in many jurisdictions have refused to adopt a rule
such as is stated in the principal English case, adhering to the
doctrine that the right of insane persons and infants is absolute
and paramount, and superior to all equities of other persons-
that if the right to avoid be restricted the purpose of the law to
protect those who cannot protect themselves is defeated. 10 On
the other hand, the right to rescind is equitable and there seems
to be no potent reason why the maxim "he who seeks equity must
do equity" should not be applied to these cases. It is surely a
harsh doctrine that an innocent person who chances to deal with
an incompetent does so at his peril, and cannot have adequate pro-
tection in a Court of equity and be heard to plead his ignorance
and good faith."' This may have been the law in cases of infancy
but the analogy between cases of infancy and insanity is not com-
plete. The status of minority is "tangible, definite and ascertain-
able" compared with the "subtle, elusive and sporadic condition
of mental unsoundness."1 2
The case of Imperial Loan Company v. Stone, supra, may be
considered as the leading case typifying the recent tendency of the
Courts of most jurisdictions to give the contract of an insane per-
son so much effect as to remove it beyond that of a mere nullity,
and to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the con-
tract, particularly its fairness and the attitude of the other con-
tracting party. An examination of New York cases in the light
'Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, I. Q. B. 599.
"Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451.
u2 Storys Eq. Jur., p. 1365 d.
'Coburn v. Raymond, 76 Conn. 484.
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of the dbctrine expressed in this decision may give us some idea
of what the law of this State is. In the case of VanDeusen v.
Sweet it is stated that the deed of an incompetent was not void-
able but absolutely void-never having "any legal existence or
vitality."" This case has been so "explained", however, as to be
practically overruled. In Blinn v. Schwarz the Court says that
the word "void" was used with a "flexible meaning" and really
meant "voidable".'" In the case of Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Hunt (decided twelve years before the principal English
case) the opinion coincides in the main with the doctrine in the
Imperial Loan Company case, i. e., that the insane party could not
rescind where the contract was fair, and where the sane party had
no knowledge of the insanity of the other.15 It must be considered,
however, that the Court there calls attention to the fact that the
contract was executed and the sane party could not be put in
statu quo. The Imperial Loan Company case contains no such
limitations, but states broadly: "A contract made by a person of
unsound mind is not voidable at that person's option, if the other
party to the contract believed at the time he made the contract that
the person with whom he was dealing was of sound mind. In
order to avoid a fair contract on the ground of insanity the mental
capacity of the one must be known to the other of the contracting
parties."
From the dicta in the case of Mutual Life Insurance Company
v. Hunt it may fairly be assumed that in New York a purely execu-
tory contract, or any bargain in which the consideration can be
restored, may be rescinded, even though the other party was
ignorant of the insanity."6 The Courts of Georgia have laid down
such a rule, and it seems to be a beneficial modification of the rule
in the Imperial Loan Company case, because a contrary rule would
mean the absolute enforcement of the contracts of an insane person
unless bad faith could be shown on the part of the other party,
and it is difficult to see how much more protection would be
afforded to lunatics under such a rule than to sane persons.'7
The good faith of the sane party would only be material then,
in the case of an executed contract in which the consideration
could not be restored to the sane party. The rule in England
seems to go to the extent that even if the consideration did not
"51 N. Y. 378.
"177 N. Y. 260.
"79 N. Y. 541.
"Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, supra.
"Wooley v. Gaines, 114 Ga. 122: Williston on Sales, p. 38.
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inure to the benefit of the lunatic, the contract cannot be set
aside. It seems to be assumed in the New York cases that only
in cases where the insane person has derived a benefit from the
contract will he be denied the right to rescind.'8
It seems, therefore, that in cases where the contract of an
incompetent is executed and the consideration cannot be restored
to the other party, the good faith of the sane person is material.
The further question arises as to who must sustain the burden of
proving this good faith. Again it is established in the case of
Imperial Loan Company v. Stone, that one who "seeks to avoid
a contract on the ground of his insanity must plead and prove not
merely his incapacity but also the other party's knowledge of that
fact, and unless he proves these two things he cannot succeed."
If there is any doubt as to the variance of New York cases with
the English case on other points, it seems to be established that
the New York law is certain on this point. In the case of Merritt
v. Merritt, the case of Imperial Loan Company v. Stone is cited
and disapproved on this point.' 9 The Court says: "It is quite
enough to put upon the lunatic's representatives the burden of
proving lunacy. That burden is by no means light; . . . the
party claiming under the instrument may well be called upon to
show his good faith and ignorance of the insanity". This, like
the other limitations placed upon what may be termed the English
rule, seems reasonable, and manifests the tendency of the New
York Courts to pursue a middle course, as they have in the law
of infants' contracts. The result is that a certain protection is
afforded to those who are unable to meet their fellow men on an
equal footing by reason of their mental incapacity, and at the




'Riggs v. American Tract Society, 84 N. Y. 330.
"43 App. Div. 68.
